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1. Background 
The internationalization of Antitrust Policy is based along three main lines. The first 
deals with the “ultractive” effects of some antitrust measures. One of the most 
important of these was the sentence inflicted by the European Commission, 
confirmed by the Court of Justice, on the US company Microsoft for abuse of its 
dominant position (see § VI.A.4 “Global Competition and Territorial Limits: The 
Microsoft Case” by T. Koziel); a decision that contributed significantly to the worsening 
relations between the United States and Europe with regard to the application of 
antitrust laws. The Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice severely 
criticized the position of the European Commission. This situation bore a striking 
resemblance to an earlier clash between the two, when the EU refused to authorize a 
merger between General Electrics and Honeywell. The clash was hard: the American 
antitrust authority criticized its European counterpart for having protected 
competitors from the dominant firm and not having considered the interests of 
consumers, arguing that this tape of action fails to provide competitors with incentives 
to maximize their own efficiency. Beyond these different economic visions of antitrust 
policy lie political differences, including over the protectionist potential of the 
enforcement of antitrust law. The advent of a democratic administration brought 
about by President Obama’s win has done much to decrease these differences between 
US and EU policy on these matters; indeed, the US has begun again of late to frown 
upon – and to punish –market monopolization practices. 
The second line is international and specifically bilateral. It is based upon the use 
of “Positive Comity” agreements, which deal with cooperation on antitrust issues 
between economic areas such as the European Union and the United States. One such 
agreement between these two parties was signed in 1991; however, it was applied only 
once in the procedure of the Commission on the case of the Crs Sabre/Amadeus: 
non-discriminatory practices against the American Crs were accepted. The limit of this 
particular kind of cooperation is double: it does not deal with mergers; the antitrust 
authority that acts for the other one does not become the exclusive titular of the 
proceedings and the other authority can start another procedure that overlaps the 
former. In Europe, the Commission functions as the public actor in this process; the 
role of Member States is more hidden. 
The third line is international and specifically multilateral. It is based on the 
international network of National Competition Authorities (NCAs): the International 
Competition Network (ICN). It is interesting to note that the main drivers of the 
internationalization process are the NCAs, and not States themselves. Even the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) is working on the effects of antitrust on international trade 
(“The Doha Agenda – Interactions between trade and competition policy”). In this 
context, the main goal is to create an international and multilateral framework for the 
regulation of antitrust policy; however, the actors participating in this process are 
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States themselves, within the broader framework of WTO negotiations. The 
negotiations relating “competition issues”, at Cancun in 2003, failed. As a result, this 
topic has excluded to further negotiations. The global financial crisis, which started in 
2008, is another obstacle to this development. 
It is not difficult to grasp the reasons behind the attempt to internationalize the 
regulation of antitrust policy. It is, however, somewhat harder to understand why 
multiple avenues are being sought to achieve this, and why the activity of the ICN is 
the more advanced of these.  
The above outline suggests a paradox. On one hand, inter-State agreements do 
not seem to take off: for example, the positive comity agreements do not seem to have 
been effective, and negotiations at the WTO have failed. On the other hand, the 
creation of global standards by the ICN seems to be more successful, but it is not 
accountable. The ICN is a private association of public authorities contributing to the 
production of rules: the effectiveness of these rules will be determined by the national 
activity of its members. 
 
 
2. Materials  
- Court of First Instance, Judgment no. 63/2007, of 17 September 2007, in case 
T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission 
(http://www.curia.europa.eu/en/actu/news/news.htm); 
- Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the 
United States of America on the application of positive comity principles in the 
enforcement of their competition laws, 4 June 1998 
(http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21998A0618%2801%29:
EN:NOT); 
- DoJ, Antitrust division, International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, 
Final Report, 2000 
(http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm); 
- ICN Merger Working Group, ICN Recommended Practice for Merger Analysis, 
(http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf)
; 
- ICN Merger Working Group, ICN Recommended Practice for Merger 
Notification and Review Procedures 
(http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc324.pdf)
. 
 
 
3. Analysis 
The attention on the International Competition Network activities must be strong. In 
particular, the Merger Working Group is a good example of how much the ICN is 
globalizing merger review regime.  
The ICN Merger Working Group (MWG) was established in 2001. Since then, 
MWG prepared a large quantity of documents and organized many activities. The 
MWG, ten years after its inception, has decided to evaluate its action submitting them 
to the authorities who are its members and to non-governmental advisors. Based on 
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the findings of this evaluation, it was found that the work of the MWG has been 
received very positively. In fact, MWG has contributed to increasing the quality of the 
system of merger control around the world. Among the members of the ICN, there is 
a widespread knowledge and use of tools such as ICN Recommended Practice for 
Merger Analysis and ICN Recommended Practice for Merger Notification and Review 
Procedures. Slightly lower but still high is familiar with the Merger Guidelines 
Workbook and the Investigative Techniques Handbook.  
Now, the MWG wants to increase the dissemination and implementation of the 
results of their action increasing participation. Furthermore, the MWG will continue to 
develop its action in increasing the potential of Recommended Practice for Merger 
Analysis, doing new research on the mergers economic analysis and investigative 
techniques, by integrating the Investigative Techniques Handbook and the Merger 
Guidelines Workbook. The MWG finally is open to other issues, including 
cooperation between several authorities in merger control. MWG’s work products 
have been widely used by national authorities for competition and not only. In 
particular, the RPs had a significant impact contributing to a radical change in the 
merger reviews regime around the world. Many competition authorities have expressed 
their intention to continue to follow the guidelines of the ICN MWG. For this reason, 
the MWG will continue to update and to develop its operational tools to maintain 
their relevance and usefulness.  
There is a global unity in the merger reviews regime. In fact, there are few cases 
of legal barriers to the use and implementation of the products of MWG. It follows 
that the ability to spread and homogenization of the rules on merger control depends 
on the authoritativeness of the ICN, which is cause and effect in the NCA’s propensity 
to adhere to its guidelines.  
 
 
4. Issues 
States, having international legitimation, do not favour the internationalization process 
of the antitrust policy: they prefer having a global competition regulated rather by 
politics than by law. Vice versa, the NCAs would prefer the juridification of fair 
competition. They face the States: they are organically dependent from the States but 
functionally independent. This underlines the skew between public powers and general 
interests caused by economic delocalization.  
State positions prevail very often on the antitrust authorities positions causing 
many more conflict cases than coordination cases. The great relevance of antitrust 
“ultractive” measures shows that antitrust law enforcement is based on the clash 
between protectionist economic policies. Using them, the States try to maintain 
hegemonic positions in global competition.  
Internationalization is based on the ICN activity and on cooperation so the 
consent of national Authorities is necessary. The Authorities can integrate despite of 
the orientations of the States in which they are structurally placed (but only if they are 
independent from politics). The more the working group deals with single sectors or 
problematic areas, the greater is the real value of ICN suggestions. We can notice it 
very easily as regards merger control. We have to consider that the terms “best 
practices” are inaccurate and misleading. It is known that the real content of the 
antitrust policy is defined by the Authorities through continuous series of adjudication 
measures with the same criterions. The first step is to frame the general norms; then, 
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normative contents are delegated to the executive plan and specified. The ICN can 
have a role in the phase of delegation. If the national Authority concurs in elaborating 
criteria – for example, revealing indexes of the dominant position of a firm in the 
relevant market – even in absence of strong compliance mechanisms such as 
“command and control”, it is almost certain that the Authority will use that criteria. 
The ICN contributes in defining the evolution of the antitrust law and through 
horizontal connection between authorities it makes the corrections of market failures 
easier. Nevertheless, ICN decision-making process – based on consensus – is a 
weakening factor of the institutional functioning. How is the internationalization 
process shaped for privates? If the statement that I’ve already demonstrated about the 
ICN incidence on delegation is true, then the ICN has some public powers despite its 
subjective features. It is opportune to wonder if its activity is accountable and if it 
allows privates to participate in the process identifying frames best practices. From this 
point of view, things seem to be backward. It is the non-public subjectivity of the ICN 
that produces a strong underestimation of its real influence upon linked antitrust 
Authorities. For this reason, North American or European “notice and comment” 
practices and the consequent participation of privates plus the national authorities do 
not usually precede the emanation of the recommendation to the markets by the ICN 
working group.  
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